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I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Washington Growth Management Act
(GMA or "the Act")1 marked a major change in local government
land use decision-making in the State of Washington. The Act's
requirement that local governments adopt a comprehensive land use
plan (Plan) to guide development consistent with goals adopted by the
state legislature and then implement that Plan with consistent
regulations2 was a revolutionary step toward statewide land use
planning. Much has been written about the "GMA revolution."
These writings primarily focus on the GMA's procedural and
substantive requirements for adoption of Plans and how these
mandates have changed the face of land use planning in Washington
State.
* Samuel W. Plauchi is a partner at Buck & Gordon LLP, where he represents a variety of
municipal and private clients in land use and environmental litigation, including litigation before the
Growth Management Hearings Boards. Before coming to Seattle, Mr. Plauch6 served as a trial attorney in the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice.
** Amy L. Kosterlitz is a partner at Buck & Gordon LLP. Ms. Kosterlitz represents developers, citizens, and municipalities in all phases of land use and environmental permitting, administrative
hearings, and litigation. She also represents public and private clients in Growth Management Hearings Board proceedings. Ms. Kosterlitz is a frequent author and speaker on land use and environmental legal topics for attorneys, planners, and public officials. She co-chairs an annual conference
eon GMA issues and teaches an advanced land use seminar at Seattle University School of Law
focusing on the GMA.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (1998).
2. See WASH. REV. CODE §§36.70A.040, .120. [All citations to ch. 36.70A of the Revised

Code of Washington are to the 1998 edition unless otherwise indicated - Eds.]
3. See, e.g., Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution
in Washington: Past, Present and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L.

REV.,

867-948 (1993). For an

overview of the GMA, with a particular emphasis on the 1997 amendments to the statute, see
Jared B. Black, The Land Use Study Commission and the 1997 Amendments to Washington State's
Growth ManagementAct, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 559 (1998).
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The procedure by which planning disputes are resolved under
the GMA is also an important aspect of the GMA revolution, but one
that is often overlooked. The manner in which disputes are resolved
under the GMA has tremendous implications for the success or failure
of the substantive mandates of the Act. The GMA embodies not only
a radical change in the manner in which land use planning decisions
must be made, but also a major change in the way those decisions are
appealed and reviewed. The GMA established a new administrative
body and appeal process for local land use planning decisions with the
creation of the Growth Management Hearings Boards and their
petition procedures.4 Two important factors that have influenced the
character of the GMA revolution are the scope of the Boards' review
jurisdiction and the showing that the parties must make to participate
in the GMA debate before the Boards.
This Article examines the procedures by which GMA Plans are
challenged and reviewed. While the procedural aspects of the GMA
are more mundane than its lofty goals, these procedures are an
important "road map" for the greater GMA revolution. This Article
is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the nuances of each
of the procedural issues that arise in Growth Management Hearings
Board proceedings. Indeed, most of those issues are sufficiently
complex that each would provide the fodder for separate articles.
Rather, this Article is intended to provide a practical guide to
practitioners seeking to avoid the considerable "potholes" on the road
to final resolution of GMA appeals.'
This Article first examines the shift since the enactment of the
GMA from a concentration on appeals of projects to appeals of
legislative enactments and the resulting importance of the Growth
Management Hearings Boards. The Article next addresses two major
procedural issues that arise in Growth Management Hearings Board
proceedings: (1) issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction, and (2)
issues relating to the standard of review and burden of proof. Finally,
this Article addresses a number of miscellaneous procedural issues
that have the potential for creating roadblocks in Growth
Management Hearings Board proceedings.
4. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.250-.310.
5. This Article is directed toward practitioners handling cases before the Growth Management Hearings Boards, and therefore assumes a familiarity with the basic workings of the GMA.
For an overview of the GMA, please refer to the numerous articles cited herein. For a broad,
fairly general discussion of Growth Management Hearings Board procedures without a discussion of the procedural problems created by the Boards' decisions, see Wm. H. Nielsen et al.,
Practice and Procedure Before the Growth Planning Hearings Boards, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 1323 (1993).
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II. THE GMA SHIFTS FOCUS FROM APPEALS OF PROJECTS
TO APPEALS OF PLANS

One of the revolutionary features of the GMA was mandatory
comprehensive planning for most jurisdictions, along with a requirement that land use plans be implemented with consistent regulations. 6
Previously, while comprehensive planning was authorized and was
undertaken by many jurisdictions, it was not required. Further,
comprehensive plans were merely a blueprint for more specific zoning
regulations, which might significantly diverge from the Plan The
GMA appeared to reverse this rule-title 36, chapter 70A, section
.040 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) mandates that local
governments adopt regulations consistent with their Plans.8 Most
commentators assumed that under the GMA, in the event of conflicts
between the Plan and regulations, the Plan would control. 9 Although
this assumption was called into question to some extent by one of the
first Washington Supreme Court decisions to address the GMA,10 the
effect of comprehensive planning decisions on actual development
proposals takes on new importance given the GMA requirement that
development regulations be consistent with the Plan.
Just as the GMA shifted the focus of local government land use
decisions from ad hoc individual project decisions to the underlying
comprehensive land use planning decisions, so the "action" in the land
use debate shifted from project decisions to the arena of GMA Plans
and their implementing regulations.
This new focus on the
importance of GMA Plans also changed the focus of land use appeals.
Before the enactment of the GMA, the major source of land use
litigation was appeals of individual project approvals, or "quasijudicial" decisions. There were only occasional challenges to local
comprehensive plan designations, or "legislative" decisions. The
enactment of the GMA brought a wave of appeals of local government

6. See Settle & Gavigan, supranote 3, at 915.
7. See id. at 875-80. See also Cougar Mountain Assoc. v. King County, 111 Wash 2d. 742,
757, 765 P.2d 264, 272 (1988); Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash 2d. 843, 848-49, 613 P.2d.
1148, 1152 (1980).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(3)(d) provides: "[I]f the county has a population of
fifty thousand or more, the county and each city located within the county shall adopt a comprehensive plan under this chapter and development regulations that are consistent with and
implement the comprehensive plan."
9. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 3, at 915.
10. In Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 873-74,
947 P.2d 1208, 1214-15 (1997), the court relied on pre-GMA decisions without discussing
GMA's apparent reversal of the former rule when it held that specific pre-GMA zoning regulations prevailed over a Comprehensive Plan adopted under GMA.
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planning decisions."

III. THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARDS-MAJOR
PLAYERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

GMA

The GMA created an entirely new type of administrative review
body-a Growth Management Hearings Board (GMHB)-to hear
appeals regarding whether local government Plans and regulations
meet the requirements of the Act.12 In recognition of regional
differences within the state, the statute established three different
GMHBs, each with a separate regional jurisdiction. 3 The GMHBs
have had a major impact, both substantively and procedurally, on
local governments' land use planning decisions and on the parties
affected by those decisions.
The fundamental reason for the importance of the GMHBs in
the GMA scheme is the legislature's decision to use general language
in the Act's substantive provisions. For example, the GMA's thirteen
goals are stated in broad and aspirational terms (e.g. "Reduce the inappropriate conversion of undeveloped land into sprawling, low-density
development," "Encourage efficient multimodal transportation systems," "Maintain and enhance natural resource-based industries"4),
and often express competing policies (e.g., "Encourage economic
development," "Protect the environment""). Such aspirational statements leave a great deal of room for interpretation. In addition,
11. It is notable that even after the advent of GMA there remains ample authority and, in
fact, clearer appeal procedures with which to challenge individual project permitting decisions.
See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70B (Land Use Petition Act). However, these individual project
appeals do not go to the GMHBs, but rather continue to be within the jurisdiction of the superior court. This is in contrast to the State of Oregon's growth management legislation, where an
administrative appeal body, the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), hears both challenges to
comprehensive plan amendments as well as individual project appeals prior to judicial appeals.
See Robert L. Liberty, Oregon's Comprehensive Growth Management Program: An Implementation
Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 ENVTL. L. REP., 10367, 10373 (1992). There has been
some suggestion that the Oregon system is preferable for strong GMA enforcement because prohibiting the administrative body that hears GMA planning appeals from hearing individual proj ect appeals detracts from the body's effectiveness in enforcement of GMA's mandates.
However, that topic exceeds the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the differences between
Washington's and Oregon's Land Use Planning and Growth Management Acts, see Hong N.
Huynh, Comment, Administrative Forces in Oregon's Land Use Planning and Washington's
Growth Management, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 115, 137-38 (1997).
12. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.250-.310.
13. The Eastern Washington Board has jurisdiction over counties east of the crest of the
Cascade mountains; the Central Puget Sound Board has jurisdiction over King, Pierce, Snohomish and Kitsap Counties; and the Western Washington Board has jurisdiction over all counties
west of the Cascade mountains not included in the Central Puget Sound Board's jurisdiction.
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.250.
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(2), (3), (8).
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(5), (10).
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several of the key concepts in the GMA, such as what constitutes
"urban" or "rural" development, were only very generally described, 6
leaving additional room for interpretation.' 7 Because local Plans are
often challenged by at least one of the opposing forces in the local land
use debate, the GMHBs have had numerous opportunities to
interpret, and even mold, these somewhat vague statutory provisions. "
Furthermore, while the statute provides that local governments'
Plans are "presumed valid," 9 the GMHBs have taken a very activist
role in interpreting the statute, invalidating significant portions of
local plans for noncompliance with the GMA.2" Indeed, the GMHBs
have taken such an active role in second-guessing local governments'
interpretation and application of the GMA that they have been
accused of unauthorized "rulemaking."'" This concern over the active
role of the GMHB led the legislature to adopt amendments intended
to cut back on their power to overturn local government decisionmaking and to strengthen the presumption of validity accorded to
local plans and regulations.22
Because the GMHBs have become a major force in the interpre16. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.030(15) provides: "Rural development can consist of a
variety of uses and residential densities, including clustered residential development, at levels
that are consistent with the preservation of rural character and the requirements of the rural element."
RCW 36.70A.030(17) provides: "'Urban growth' refers to growth that makes intensive use
of land for the location of buildings, structures, and impermeable surfaces to such a degree as to
be incompatible with the primary use of land for the production of food, other agricultural products, or fiber, or the extraction of mineral resources, rural uses, rural development, and natural
resource lands designated pursuant to RCW 36.70A.170."
17. See Nielsen et al., supra note 5, at 1324 ("In addition, several provisions of the GMA
were the product of painful and acrimonious debate and were less than models of clarity.").
18. For a discussion of the extensive criticism levied at the GMHBs and their decisions, see
Black, supra note 3, at 574; Huynh, supra note 11, at 137-38; Derek W. Woolston, Comment,
Simply a Matter of Growing Pains? Evaluating the Controversy Surrounding the Growth Management HearingsBoards, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1219 (1996).
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(1).
20. See, e.g., Wells v. Whatcom County, Western Washington Growth Management
Hearings Board (WWGMHB) No. 97-2-0030c, Final Decision and Order (Jan. 16, 1998);
Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board
(CPSGMHB) No. 95-3-0039, Final Decision and Order (Oct. 6,1995).
21. See Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0068c, Final Decision and
Order (Mar. 12, 1996).
22. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.290(1) (prohibiting advisory opinions); WASH. REV.
CODE § 36.70A.320(3) (replacing "preponderance of evidence" with "clearly erroneous" standard); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(1) (legislative intent to apply more deferential standard).
For a detailed comparison of the "preponderance of evidence" standard with the "clearly
erroneous" standard, see Black, supra note 3, at 576. For a discussion of the difficulties that
arose from the GMHBs' prior interpretations of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard,
see Huynh, supra note 11, at 141-42; and Woolston, supra note 18, at 1240-41.
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tation and application of the GMA to local government planning decisions, procedural issues related to obtaining review of GMA decisions
have become more important. In addition, the scope of the GMHBs'
subject matter jurisdiction is a key determinant of the extent of the
GMHBs' authority to interpret the GMA and the GMA's relationship
with other statutory mandates. The scope of participants' standing to
appeal local GMA planning decisions is important in determining who
the parties in the GMA debate will be and which issues will be championed. The process by which GMA matters may be appealed, along
with numerous potential procedural pitfalls, impact the issues that will
come within the GMHBs' purview. Thus, careful attention to procedural issues may greatly influence substantive outcomes in GMA
cases.
IV. SURVEY OF GMHB PROCEDURAL DECISIONS
One of the beneficial aspects of the new emphasis on GMHB
decisions in land use litigation is a less obscure set of procedures for
appeal of legislative land use decisions. Gone are the days when all
such appeals required an intimate knowledge of the numerous judicially created procedural requirements for constitutional writs of certiorari. Those procedures have now been replaced by statutory and
23
administrative provisions governing procedures before the GMHBs.
These new procedures, and their interpretation by the GMHBs, have
had important implications for which GMA matters have been cognizable and which parties have been heard.
Some of the procedural rules for the GMHBs are expressly stated
in the GMA.24 In other instances, the GMHBs have established their
own rules of procedure.25 Finally, in the absence of some other governing provision, the rules established in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)26 also apply to proceedings before the GMHBs,
27
unless they conflict with a specific provision of the GMA.
In spite of these layers of procedural guidelines (or perhaps
because of them), the different GMHBs have reached divergent decisions on issues ranging from the scope of their subject matter jurisdiction to the extent of their remedial powers.28 Although appellate
23. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.270-.340.

24. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280 (requirements for petitions to Growth
Management Hearings Boards).
25. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-110 (1999).
26. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.05 (1998).
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.270(7).
28. The reader will note that the discussion of GMHB decisions that follows primarily
discusses decisions by two of the three GMHBs-the Western Washington GMHB and the
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courts are beginning to issue decisions that resolve some of these differences, these varying interpretations require that the land use practitioner take a cautious approach in litigation before the GMHBs.29
To aid in navigating this process, following is a survey of some of
the key procedural decisions by the GMHBs, analysis of the importance of these decisions, and some tips for the land use practitioner.
A. Subject MatterJurisdictionof the GMHBs
1.

Overview

The GMHBs have jurisdiction to review petitions alleging that a
state agency, county, or city plan under the GMA is not in compliance
with: (1) the requirements of the GMA; (2) the Shoreline Management Act as it relates to shoreline master programs and amendments
thereto; or (3) SEPA as it relates to plans, development regulations, or
amendments adopted under the GMA or the Shoreline Management
Act. a° In addition, the GMHBs review petitions alleging that the
twenty-year population projections published by the State's Office of
Financial Management should be adjusted.3 1 The vast majority of
petitions before the GMHBs to date have challenged whether a local
government plan under the GMA complies with the Act.
The Western Washington GMHB and the Central Puget Sound
GMHB have taken different approaches in deciding which types of
local enactments that they have jurisdiction to review. The Central
Puget Sound GMHB has narrowly construed its jurisdiction to extend
only to review of ordinances enacted in an effort to comply with the
GMA.3 2 Conversely, the Western Board has held that it has jurisdiction to review whether any land use planning action complies with the

Central Puget Sound GMHB. This focus is not intended to in any way diminish the significance
of the Eastern Washington GMHB. However, because that Board has issued far fewer decisions
than the other two GMHBs, the Eastern Washington GMHB has simply not addressed many of
the procedural issues discussed in this Article.
29. These varied interpretations are at least partially the result of the Central and Western
Boards' refusal to consider each others decisions "binding." See, e.g., Island County Citizens'
Growth Management Coalition v. Island County, WWGMHB No. 98-2-0023c, Final Decision
and Order (Mar. 1, 1999); West Seattle Defense Fund v. City of Seattle, CPSGMHB No. 94-30006, Final Decision and Order (Apr. 4, 1995). See also Black, supra note 3, at 575; Huynh,
supra note 11, at 138-39; Woolston, supra note 18, at 1245-48.
30. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(1)(a). As noted above, the GMHBs do not have
jurisdiction to review local government decisions to approve or disapprove permits for individual
land use projects.
31. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(1)(b).
32. See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Pierce County, CPSGMHB No. 97-3-0013, Order Granting Dispositive Motion (May 1, 1997).
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GMA, regardless of whether it was adopted under the Act.33
2.

Substantive Implications of the GMHBs'
Jurisdictional Decisions

How broadly or narrowly the GMHBs construe their subject
matter jurisdiction can have important substantive implications for the
integrity of the GMA planning system. For example, the GMA
requires that local governments establish Urban Growth Areas
(UGAs), which are the only areas in which urban growth and urban
services such as water and sewer are allowed.34 The GMA also states
that cities are to be the primary providers of these urban services."
However, other statutes predating the GMA, such as the Public
Water System Coordination Act,36 also impact how the jurisdictional
boundaries for water and sewer service are determined. If the GMHB
does not have jurisdiction to reconcile conflicts between GMA mandates regarding the provision of water and sewer services and the
mandates of other statutes that address the same issues, local governments could potentially rely on these other statutes to subvert the provisions of the GMA.
An example of this potential for conflict arose in Auburn v. Pierce
County.37 Pierce County determined in its GMA plan that a certain
area should be within the City of Auburn's UGA. However, the
county had previously adopted a Comprehensive Water System Plan
(CWSP) designating the City of Bonney Lake as the provider of water
service within a portion of Auburn's UGA. That CWSP was adopted
as an appendix to the county's Comprehensive Plan. In updating its
CWSP, the county refused to modify Bonney Lake's water service
area to make it consistent with the county's UGA designations.38
Auburn appealed to the Central Puget Sound GMHB, arguing
that the GMHB should require the county to revise its CWSP to designate Auburn as the water purveyor for all areas within its UGA to
ensure consistency between the CWSP and the county's Comprehensive Plan. The Central Puget Sound GMHB refused to decide the
case, ruling that the adoption of a CWSP did not arise under the
GMA, but rather the Public Water System Coordination Act, chapter
70.116 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), a statute over
33. See, e.g., Rosewood Assocs. v. Town of Friday Harbor, WWGMHB No. 96-2-0020,
Order on Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dec. 6, 1996).
34. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.030(17), (1).
35. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110(4).
36. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70.116 (1998).
37. CPSGMHB No. 97-3-0013, Order Granting Dispositive Motion (May 1, 1997).
38. See id.
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which the GMHB had no jurisdiction. This left Auburn in the awkward position of challenging the consistency of the CWSP and Comprehensive Plan in superior court, which lacked jurisdiction to review
the Comprehensive Plan.3 9
The Western Washington GMHB, in contrast, has held that its
jurisdiction extends to any land use planning ordinance with a sufficient nexus to GMA, regardless of the statutory basis for adoption of
that ordinance. In Rosewood Associates v. Town of FridayHarbor,4 ° the
petitioner challenged an ordinance limiting the size and number of
water connections for developments within the Town of Friday Harbor. The town moved to dismiss the petition because the challenged
ordinance was outside of the Board's subject matter jurisdiction. The
Board held that its jurisdiction extended to determinations of:
whether a land use planning legislative action is in violation of
the goals and requirements of RCW 36.70A. This is true
whether or not the local government has chosen to adopt the
there is a suffilegislation pursuant to RCW 36.70A, as long 4as
1
cient nexus between the action and the GMA.
Although the GMHB ultimately dismissed petitioner's challenge, it did so only after a review of the record revealed that the
town's primary intention in adopting the challenged ordinance was
water conservation, not land use planning. It also did so over the dissent of one of the GMHB members.4 2
These situations illustrate some of the potential conflicts between
the GMA and other existing statutes that bear on GMA-related topics. One could argue that it would make sense for the GMHBs to construe their jurisdiction more broadly in order to take in conflicts
between other statutes and the GMA's planning mandates. On the
other hand, critics of the GMHBs' activism have been reluctant to
request that the GMHBs increase their jurisdiction beyond the issues
that are within their statutory jurisdictional mandate. In addition,
such an extension of jurisdiction arguably conflicts with the Washington Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of GMHB jurisdiction.43 In any event, this is an area of confusion that would benefit
from a legislative clarification.
39. See id.
40. WWGMHB No. 96-2-0020, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
(Dec. 6, 1996).
41. Id. (quoting Camano Community Council v. Island County, WWGMHB No. 95-20072, Final Decision and Order (Sept. 6, 1995)).
42. See id.
43. See Skagit Surveyors & Engineers, LLC v. Skagit County, 135 Wash. 2d 542, 958 P.2d
962 (1998).
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Procedural Implications of the GMHBs'
Interpretation of Their Jurisdiction

A petition's failure to correctly determine whether a local government planning action is subject to GMHB jurisdiction could have
the significant consequence of precluding further appeals altogether.
If a challenge can be brought before the GMHB, a petitioner must
bring that challenge before attempting a writ action in superior court. 4
The divergence of GMHB opinions on the scope of their jurisdiction
adds to the confusion and creates potential procedural roadblocks for
the unwary.
The Washington Supreme Court's recent decision in Torrance v.
King County45 highlights the importance of obtaining a final determination of whether a legislative challenge is within the jurisdiction of
the GMHBs before proceeding to court. Torrance addressed an issue
that had been the source of some confusion under GMA: determining
the proper procedural vehicle for challenging a local government's
refusal to adopt a proposed amendment to its GMA Comprehensive
Plan. The Central Puget Sound GMHB had held that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the failure to adopt a suggested Comprehensive
Plan amendment.46 Accordingly, some practitioners believed that a
constitutional writ of certiorari provided the proper means of challenging such local government inaction, because such a writ is available when no other adequate remedy exists and a local government's
decision is arbitrary and capricious."
The Torrance court disagreed, finding that statutory review
before the GMHB provided a means of seeking relief for the county's
failure to adopt the suggested Plan amendment.4 8 Although the petitioner had filed a petition for review with the GMHB, and the GMHB
had refused to review that petition,49 the court noted that the peti44. See, e.g., Torrance v. King County, 136 Wash. 2d 783, 966 P.2d 891 (1998).
45. Id.
46. See City of Fircrest v. Pierce County, CPSGMHB No. 98-3-0002, Order on Dispositive Motion (Mar. 27, 1998); Port of Seattle v. City of Des Moines, CPSGMHB No. 97-3-0014,
Final Decision and Order (Aug. 13, 1997); Cole v. Pierce County, CPSGMHB No. 96-3-0009c,
Final Decision and Order (July 31, 1996)
47. See, e.g., Saldin Sec., Inc. v. Snohomish County, 134 Wash. 2d 288, 292, 949 P.2d 370,
372 (1998); Williams v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 97 Wash. 2d 215, 221, 643 P.2d 426, 430
(1982).
48. See Torrance, 136 Wash. 2d at 791-92, 966 P.2d at 895-96.
49. See Torrance v. King County, CPSGMHB No. 96-3-0038, Order Granting Dispositive
Motion (Mar. 31, 1997) ("[N]either can Petitioners challenge the county's decision not to adopt
Petitioners' proposed amendments.") In fact, in dismissing the Torrance petition, the Central
Puget Sound GMHB quoted its own previous decision in Cole v. Pierce County, CPSGMHB
No. 96-3-0009c, Final Decision and Order (July 31, 1996), wherein the Board held that
"recourse is elsewhere" for a challenge to a local government's failure to adopt a proposed
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tioner had failed to file a judicial appeal of the GMHB decision that
the GMHB lacked jurisdiction. Thus, the court ordered that the petitioner's constitutional writ action be dismissed.
The lesson from Torrance may well be that when there is any
doubt as to whether a challenge is within the GMHB's jurisdiction, a
petitioner should file a petition for review in the GMHB as well as a
petition for a constitutional writ in the superior court. In the exercise
of an abundance of caution, these petitions should be filed simultaneously, lest one be rejected as untimely."0 In addition, a petitioner
should judicially appeal a GMHB decision holding that it lacks jurisdiction, to ensure that all potential avenues of appeal remain viable.
At this point, jurisdictional issues can pose significant problems
for petitioners before the GMHB. Perhaps these issues will ultimately
be resolved by the legislature or the courts. In the meantime, these
issues should be carefully scrutinized by practitioners challenging local
governments' legislative actions.
B. Standing to Raise Issues Before the GMHB
1.

Standing Based Upon Participation

Another important procedural issue is the question of standing to
appeal local government GMA enactments to the GMHB. Unfortunately, standing is another point of disagreement between the Western
Washington GMHB and the Central Puget Sound GMHB.
The GMA confers standing on four groups of people:
1. The state or a county or city that plans under GMA;"
2. A person who has "participated orally or in writing before
regarding the matter on which review is
the county or city
52
being requested;"

Comprehensive Plan amendment.
50. A GMHB petition for review of a GMA enactment must be filed within 60 days of
publication of the notice of adoption of the challenged enactment. WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A.290(2). Cf City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Community Council, 91 Wash. App. 461,
468, 957 P.2d 267, 270 (1998) (holding that 30 day time period applies to constitutional writ of
certiorari, but finding factual allegations in timely complaint sufficiently requested constitutional
writ, even though such relief was not specifically requested).
51. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(2)(a). But see WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.310,
which limits appeals by the state.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(2)(b). For organizations, the Central Puget Sound
GMHB has been fairly stringent in requiring that the representatives testifying on behalf of the
organization so identify themselves before the local government. See, e.g., Banigan v. Kitsap
County, CPSGMHB No. 96-3-0016c, Order Granting Dispositive Motion (July 29, 1996).
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3. A person certified by the governor;1 3 or
4. A person with standing
under the Administrative Procedure
54
34.05.530.
RCW
Act,
The disagreement between the GMHBs arises in the interpretation of section 2, supra, and how one establishes "participation standing." The debate is over whether the quoted provision requires that a
petitioner raise, in the proceedings before the local government, each
issue on which he or she seeks GMHB review, or requires only that
petitioners make some comment before the local government on the
challenged enactment in order to then raise any issue before the
GMHB.
Relying on the requirement that petitioners participate "regarding the matter on which review is being requested," local governments
have argued that petitioners' standing should be limited to those issues
that the petitioner actually raised in the local government's adoption
proceedings. The rationale for this position is that in GMHB appeals,
despite the presumption of validity in favor of local government
plans, 5 the GMHBs have required that localities show the record of
their decision-making on disputed issues. 6 If participants do not dis-

pute issues in the local government plan adoption proceedings, local
governments are less likely to create a record supporting their decisions on those issues. If petitioners can raise those issues for the first
time before the GMHB, local governments can be "blind-sided" if
they are found noncompliant and forced to review an issue on remand.
Such a process is cumbersome and costly for local governments.
All three GMHBs initially rejected such an "issue-specific"
standing requirement.57 The rationale for the GMHBs' broad interpretation of standing seemed to hinge on the broad public participa53. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(2)(c).
54. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(2)(d). In deciding whether a person can establish
standing under the APA, the GMHBs have applied the two-part test of Trepanier v. Everett, 64
Wash. App. 380, 382, 824 P.2d 524, 525 (1992): (1) whether petitioner is in the zone of interests
protected by the statute and (2) whether petitioner will suffer an injury in fact. See, e.g., Lakehaven Utility Dist. v. City of Federal Way, CPSGMHB No. 97-3-0031, Order on Dispositive
Motion (Mar. 6, 1998); Jefferson County Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Port Townsend,
WWGMHB No. 96-2-0029, Order on Motion (Nov. 27, 1996).
55. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(1).
56. See, e.g., Bremerton v. Kitsap County, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0039, Final Decision and
Order (Oct. 6, 1995) (requiring that the county "show its work").
57. See, e.g., Wells v. Whatcom County, WWGMHB No. 97-2-0030c, Order Denying
Motion and Request for Reconsideration (Oct. 10, 1997); Bremerton v. Kitsap County,
CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0039c, Order on Motion (Apr. 22, 1997); Woodmansee v. Ferry County,
Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (EWGMHB) No. 95-1-0010, Final
Decision and Order (May 13, 1996).
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tion focus in the GMA,
of which the GMHBs considered themselves
58
part.
integral
an
be
to
More recently, however, the issue has become less clear. The
Whatcom County Superior Court reversed the Western Washington
GMHB's decision in Wells v. Whatcom County, 9 holding that the
GMA limits a petitioner's standing to appeal a local government
enactment to those matters that a petitioner raised before the local
government.6" The court's decision was based strictly on an interpretation of the plain language of RCW 36.70A.280(2)(b), which requires
participation "regarding the matter" on which review is being requested. The court held that this provision clearly required that petitioners61
raise all issues in a GMHB proceeding before the local government.
This decision is currently on appeal before Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals.62
Shortly thereafter, the Central Puget Sound GMHB, although
professing to continue its rejection of "issue-specific standing," ruled:
To have meaningful public participation and avoid "blind-siding" local governments, members of the public must explain
their land-use planning concerns to local government in sufficient detail to give the local government the opportunity to consider these concerns as it weighs and balances its priorities and
options under GMA.6 3
Thus, the Central Puget Sound GMHB now interprets RCW
36.70A.280(2)(b) as requiring that petitioners raise their complaints in
a meaningful fashion before the local government during the GMA
adoption process. 64 The Central Puget Sound GMHB's decision was
58. See Island County Citizens Growth Management Coalition v. Island County,
\VWGMHB No. 98-2-0023, Order on Dispositive Motions (Mar. 2, 1999). The GMA originally required only that petitioners 'appear," as opposed to "participate." Some GMHB members believed that the standing requirement could be met by simply attending, as opposed to
participating in, local government proceedings. See, e.g., Nielsen, supra note 5, at 1327.
59. WWGMHB No. 97-2-0030c, Order on Denying Motion and Request for Reconsideration (Oct. 10, 1997).
60. See Whatcom County v. Western Wash. Growth Management Hearings Bd., Civ. No.
98-2-00546-3 (Order Remanding Case, Sept. 25, 1998).
61. See id.
62. See Whatcom County, No. 43397-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. Division I).
63. Alpine v. Kitsap County, CPSGMHB No. 98-3-0032c, Order on Motions to Supplement the Record (Oct. 7, 1998). The Central Puget Sound GMHB went on to articulate the test
for determining whether a petitioner has met its participation standing requirements as follows:
If a petitioner's participation is reasonably related to the petitioner's issue as presented
to the Board, then the petitioner has standing to raise and argue that issue; if the petitioner's participation is not related to the issue as presented to the Board, then the
petitioner does not have standing to raise and argue the issue.
Id.
64. The Central Puget Sound GMHB also made clear that the petitioner who is raising the
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based on the importance given to the local planning process and the
opportunities for participation in that process.
Given the difference of opinion as to whether the GMA requires
"issue-specific" standing, participants would be well advised to raise
all issues that may ultimately form the basis of a GMHB appeal in the
proceedings before the local government. Such participation will also
help ensure that the participant will have material in the record to bolster his or her case because, as discussed below, the petitioner bears
the burden of proof in most proceedings before the GMHB.6 5 In
addition, a full debate on the issues before the local government might
obviate the need for some appeals, as the parties may better evaluate
the merits of their positions and come to a consensus during the plan
adoption phase.
Finally, it is worth noting that if a petitioner can establish standing on some basis other than participation before the local government
(e.g., if a petitioner has standing under the APA's standing requirements66), the issue-specific participation requirements of RCW
36.70A.280(2)(b) arguably do not apply. Thus, if a petitioner can
argue that he or she has suffered an injury within the zone of interests
protected by GMA,6 7 this argument should be included in the petition.
2.

Standing to Raise Issues Under the State
Environmental Policy Act

The GMHBs' jurisdiction extends to deciding whether a local
government's GMA adoptions are consistent with the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), RCW chapter 43.21C. 6'8 The GMHBs
have also reached different conclusions as to the requirements for
obtaining standing to raise SEPA challenges.
To determine whether a petitioner has standing to raise challenges under SEPA, the Central Puget Sound GMHB has adopted the
two part test embodied in Trepanier v. Everett69 for judicial review of
SEPA issues: (1) that petitioners are within the zone of interests protected by SEPA and (2) that the local government's failure to comply
issue before the Board must be the person that raised the issue in the local government adoption
proceedings. See Alpine, CPSGMHB No. 98-3-0032c (Oct. 7, 1998) ("[Petitioner] itself must
have participated 'regarding the matter' it wants the Board to review; it cannot establish standing
solely based on the participation of another.")
65. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(2).
66. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(4).
67. See supra note 54.
68. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280(1).
69. 64 Wash. App. 380, 382, 824 P.2d 524, 525 (1992).
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with SEPA has caused an injury-in-fact to petitioners.70 Although the
Central Puget Sound GMHB has noted that this test is difficult to
meet with respect to legislative enactments, it has consistently refused
to adopt a less stringent SEPA standing requirement."
The Western Washington GMHB, on the other hand, has
refused to apply the Trepaniertest to determine SEPA standing before
the GMHB.72 Instead, the Western Washington GMHB only
requires that a petitioner meet the standing requirements of the GMA
(RCW 36.70A.280(2)) to raise a SEPA challenge before the Board.7 3
The Western Washington GMHB and Central Puget Sound
GMHB also disagree on whether a petitioner is required to exhaust
available administrative remedies before raising a SEPA challenge
before the GMHB. The Central Puget Sound GMHB requires
exhaustion of available administrative remedies."4 Conversely, the
Western Washington GMHB has not required exhaustion of administrative remedies as a precondition to raising a SEPA challenge before
the GMHB.7"
The Western Washington GMHB's SEPA standing and exhaustion decisions have the benefit of implementing a single jurisdictional
test for all GMHB challenges, regardless of whether they relate to
noncompliance with GMA or noncompliance with SEPA. However,
70. See Kelly v. Snohomish County, CPSGMHB No. 97-3-0012c, Order on Dispositive
Motions and Motions to Supplement the Record (May 8, 1997) ("The petition must allege that
petitioners are within the zone of interests protected by SEPA and that the SEPA determination
will cause specific and perceptible harm." (citations omitted)); Vashon-Maury v. King County,
CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0008, Final Decision and Order (Oct. 23, 1995) ("Crucially, to assert
SEPA standing, petitioners must show that they are within the zone of interests protected by
SEPA and allege an injury in fact in the petition for review."). Although this standing test is the
same as the APA standing test, the Central Puget Sound GMHB has noted that a petitioner with
standing under the APA does not necessarily also have standing to raise a SEPA challenge.
Rural Bainbridge Island v. City of Bainbridge Island, CPSGMHB No. 98-3-0030, Order on
Dispositive Motion (Oct. 16, 1998) (noting that the protected interests are different under GMA
and SEPA).
71. See Pilchuck v. Snohomish County, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0047c, Order Granting
Snohomish County's Dispositive Motion to Dismiss SEPA Claims (Aug. 17, 1995) ("The Board
itself has repeatedly acknowledged the difficulty for petitioners to demonstrate the 'specific
injury'.., and thus to obtain SEPA standing. In addition, the Board has pointed out that the
common-law SEPA standing test is 'inappropriate' in a GMA context. Nonetheless, until the
test is modified by the courts, or the legislature amends the SEPA standing statute, this Board is
bound by the test.").
72. See, e.g., Island County Citizens' Growth Management Coalition v. Island County,
WWGMHB No. 98-2-0023c, Order on Motion to Dismiss (Mar. 1, 1999).
73. See id.
74. See Hapsmith v. City of Auburn, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0075c, Final Decision and
Order (May 10, 1996).
75. See Island County Citizens' Growth Management Coalition, 98-2-0023c \VWGMHB
(Mar. 1, 1999).
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those decisions interpret the GMA provisions to permit SEPA challenges that would not be permitted under the analogous SEPA provisions. As the Central Puget Sound GMHB noted, had the legislature
intended such a fundamental expansion of SEPA review, it would
likely have expressly stated that intention in either the GMA or
SEPA. In light of the Washington Supreme Court's narrow construction of GMHB jurisdiction, the Western Washington GMHB's interpretation of the requirements for SEPA standing and exhaustion may
be subject to attack on judicial appeal.
C. Standardof Review/Burden of Proof
As noted in the introductory section of this Article, the GMHBs
have been criticized for being somewhat overzealous in their review of
local governments' GMA enactments.7 6 In response to that criticism,
in 1997, the legislature increased the standard of review for GMHB
appeals from the previous "preponderance of evidence" standard to
the more deferential "clearly erroneous" standard.77 In a statement of
purpose, the legislature made clear that its intent was to provide
greater deference to local government decision-making:
In amending RCW 36.70A.320(3) by section 20(3), chapter 429,
Laws of 1997, the legislature intends that the boards apply a
more deferential standard of review to actions of counties and
cities than the preponderance of the evidence standard provided
for under existing law. In recognition of the broad range of discretion that may be exercised by counties and cities consistent
with the requirements of this chapter, the legislature intends for
the boards to grant deference to counties and cities in how they
plan for growth, consistent with the requirements and goals of
this chapter. Local comprehensive plans and development regulations require counties and cities to balance priorities and
options for action in full consideration of local circumstances.
The legislature finds that while this chapter requires local planning to take place within a framework of state goals and
requirements, the ultimate burden and responsibility for planning, harmonizing the planning goals of this chapter, and imple78
menting a county's or city's future rests with that community.
In recognition of this legislative intent, recent GMHB decisions
appear to accord more deference to local government decisions, often
finding that petitioners have failed to convince the GMHBs that local
76. See supra note 18.
77. See former WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3) (1990).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.3201.
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government actions were "clearly erroneous.""
In most proceedings before the GMHBs, the petitioner bears the
burden of proof."0 The exception to this general rule occurs when the
GMHB declares a local government's GMA enactment "invalid"
because it substantially interferes with the goals of the GMA.8 ' The
GMHB is permitted to make such a determination after a finding of
noncompliance if the Plan or regulations are thought to substantially
interfere with the goals of the GMA."2 At a compliance hearing after a
determination of invalidity has been entered, the local government
bears the burden of proving that "the ordinance or resolution it has
enacted in response to a determination of invalidity will no longer substantially interfere" with the goals of GMA."3
It is unclear, however, what happens in the situation where a
local government takes no action in response to a GMHB invalidity
determination and then adopts another GMA enactment. For example, a county that has not yet adopted its GMA Comprehensive Plan
may adopt an ordinance enacting Interim Urban Growth Areas pursuant to RCW 36.70A.110(4). The GMHB may then declare those
Interim Urban Growth Areas invalid. Rather than enacting new
Interim Urban Growth Area designations in response to the GMHB's
invalidity determination, the county may proceed with adoption of its
Comprehensive Plan. When that Plan is adopted, does the petitioner
or the county bear the burden of proof?
The Western Washington GMHB addressed this situation in
Wells v. Whatcom County. 4 There, the Western Washington GMHB
decided that Whatcom County had the burden of proof as to those
portions of its Comprehensive Plan presented by the county as
responding to the GMHB's prior determination of invalidity. 5 However, the Whatcom County Superior Court reversed, finding that the
county's Comprehensive Plan, including those aspects that addressed
the GMHB's prior invalidity order, was to be presumed valid, and
that the petitioner bore the burden of showing that it should be found
79. See, e.g., Alpine v. Kitsap County, CPSGMHB No. 98-3-0032c, Final Decision and
Order (Feb. 8,1999); Abenroth v. Skagit County, WWGMHB No. 97-2-0060c, Final Decision
and Order (Sept. 23, 1998).
80. See WASH. REV. CODE §36.70A.320(2).
81. See WASH. REV. CODE §36.70A.320(4).
82. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.302(l)(a). If a Plan or regulation is invalidated,
development applications submitted after the determination of invalidity vest to the plan or
regulation that is ultimately determined by the GMHB to no longer substantially interfere with
GMA. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.302(3)(a).
83. Id.
84. WWGMHB No. 97-2-0030c, Final Decision and Order (Jan. 16, 1998).
85. See id.
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invalid or out of compliance with GMA 6 The Whatcom County
Superior Court's decision is currently on appeal to Division I of the
Washington Court of Appeals.
D. Other Miscellaneous ProceduralIssues
A roadmap would not be complete without a look at some of the
detailed procedural requirements of GMA appeals. Because land use
appeals have often been argued and decided on procedural grounds, it
is important that practitioners carefully follow the statutory requirements.
Time Limits for Filing Petitions for Review
Under the GMA, petitions for review challenging a local government's GMA enactment "must be filed within sixty days after
publication by the legislative bodies of the county or city. "87 As to
petitions challenging a local government's failure to timely adopt a
have ruled that such a chalrequired GMA enactment, the GMHBs
88
lenge may be brought at any time.
This dichotomy has prompted some petitioners to attempt to
"couch" an untimely challenge to a local government's GMA enactment in terms of a "failure to act" challenge, often a challenge to a
local government's failure to adopt a "compliant" Comprehensive
Plan or development regulation. The GMHBs have refused to allow
such challenges, looking beyond the language of the petition to find
that the petitioner was actually attempting to bring an untimely
challenge to a GMA enactment.89
1.

2.

Content of Petitions for Review

The GMA requires that petitions for review before the GMHBs
include "a detailed statement of issues presented for resolution by the
86. See Whatcom County v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Bd.,
Civ. No. 98-2-00546-3 (Order Remanding Case, Sept. 25, 1998).
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.290(2).
88. See, e.g., Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, WWGMHB No. 982-0006c, Final Decision and Order (July 23, 1998); Kitsap Citizens for Rural Preservation v.
Kitsap County, CPSGMHB No. 94-3-0005, Order on Kitsap County's Dispositive Motion (July
27, 1994).
89. See, e.g., Lawrence Michael Investments, L.L.C. v. Town of Woodway, CPSGMHB
No. 98-3-0012, Final Decision and Order (Jan. 8, 1999); Quail Construction, Inc. v. City of
Vancouver, WWGMHB No. 97-2-0005 Order Granting Dispositive Motion (May 6, 1997).
However, the Western Washington GMHB has sustained a "failure to act" challenge based on a
local government's failure to adopt development regulations implementing a GMA Comprehensive Plan even though the time for challenging that Comprehensive Plan had expired. See Citizens for Mount Vernon, WWGMHB No. 98-2-0006c (July 23, 1998).
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board."90 More specific content requirements for petitions for review
are found in the GMHBs' procedural rules.91 The GMHBs have, on
occasion, strictly interpreted these content requirements, resulting in
serious difficulty for some petitioners.
For example, the GMHBs' procedural rules require that petitioners provide a detailed statement of issues "that specifies the provision of the act or other statute allegedly being violated and, if
applicable, the provision of the document that is being appealed."9 2
The importance of this provision is heightened by the 1997 amendment to RCW 36.70A.290(1), which prohibits the GMHBs from
issuing "advisory opinions on issues not presented to the board in the
statement of issues, as modified by any prehearing order."93 The
Western Washington GMHB has strictly interpreted this provision as
requiring a petitioner to seek a determination of invalidity expressly
questioning whether the challenged ordinance substantially interferes
with the goals of GMA in the issue statement of the petition; simply
requesting invalidity in the "relief requested" portion of the petition
was insufficient to raise the issue.94
The GMHBs' rules of procedure also require that petitions for
review contain a statement "specifying the type and the basis of the
petitioner's standing before the board pursuant to RCW
36.70A.280(2).""g This provision requires that the petitioner distinguish between participation standing, governor certified standing,
APA standing, and SEPA standing. The Central Board has interpreted this provision fairly strictly, limiting a petitioner's potential
bases for standing to those specifically alleged in the petition.96 The
Western Board has been less exacting, looking to whether a petitioner
can actually demonstrate any basis for standing regardless of the
97
statement in his or her petition.
90. WASH. REV. CODE §36.70A.290(1).
91.

See WASH. ADMIN. CODE 242-02-210 (1999).

92. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 242-02-210(2)(c) (1999). See also Nielsen, supra note 5, at 1328
("These rules require you to make a detailed list of issues that you, the Petitioner, are asking the
Board to decide.").
93. See 1997 Wash. Laws 2629, ch. 429 § 12.
94. See Citizens for Mount Vernon, WWGMHB No. 98-2-0006c (July 23, 1998). The
Board so held in spite of the fact that the "relief requested" portion of the petition requested an
order of invalidity. Prior to the 1997 amendments to the GMA, the Western Washington
GMHB had held that invalidity was not an "issue," but an aspect of the relief requested in a
petition. See Hudson v. Clallam County, WWGMHB No. 96-2-0031, Final Decision and
Order (Apr. 15, 1997).
95. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-210(d) (1999).
96. See, e.g., Lakehaven Utility District v. City of Federal Way, CPSGMHB No. 97-30031, Order on Dispositive Motions (Mar. 6, 1998).
97. See, e.g., Jefferson County Homebuilders Ass'n v. Port Townsend, WWGMHB No.
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Service of Petitions for Review

The GMHB procedural rules also require that petitioners
"promptly" serve their petitions for review on certain designated local
government representatives (the county auditor for counties, and the
mayor, city manager, or city clerk for cities).98 If a petitioner does not
substantially comply with these service requirements, the GMHB
rules authorize dismissal of the petition for review.99
The Western Washington GMHB has refused to dismiss petitions for review based on the failure to properly serve the relevant local
government official, noting that the service requirement is found
solely in the GMHBs' procedural rules and is not based on any provision of the GMA.'0 ° The Central Puget Sound GMHB, on the other
for
hand, has applied these service requirements to dismiss petitions
101
review that were not promptly served on the designated official.
4.

Amendment of Petitions for Review

The GMHBs allow petitioners to amend their petitions "as a
matter of right" until thirty days after the date of filing. 2 After that
thirty day period lapses, petitioners may amend their petitions only by
order of the Board, and amendments "shall not be freely granted."'0 3
Both the Central Puget Sound and Western Washington GMHBs
have been reluctant to allow amendments after the lapse of the thirtyday "grace period."" 4
5.

Prehearing Orders

After a petition for review is filed, the GMHB typically sets a

96-2-0029, Order on Motion (Nov. 27, 1996).
98. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-230(1) (1999).
99. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-230(2) (1999).
100. See Taxpayers for Responsible Government v. City of Oak Harbor, WWGMHB No.
97-2-0061, Order Denying Dismissal (Dec. 1997).
101. See Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0068c, Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 9, 1996) (failure to properly serve county auditor); Salisbury v. City of Bonney Lake, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0058, Order Granting Bonney Lake's Motion to Dismiss (Oct.
27, 1995) (failure to properly serve city officials).
102. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-260(1) (1999). The GMHBs have not addressed
the issue of whether this provision, which is not based on any provision of the GMA, may be
used to impermissibly extend the 60-day limitation on challenging local government enactments.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.290(2).
103. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-260(2) (1999).
104. See, e.g., Friends of Fennel Creek v. City of Bonney Lake, CPSGMHB No. 97-30005, Order on Motions (Apr. 22, 1997); Banigan v. Kitsap County, CPSGMHB No. 96-30016c, Order Granting Dispositive Motion (July 29, 1996); Taxpayers for Responsible Growth,
WWGMHB No. 96-2-0002, Order on Dispositive Motions (May 6,1996).
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prehearing conference. 10 5 At that prehearing conference, the GMHB
and the parties discuss a variety of topics, including the precise statement of issues that the GMHB will be asked to resolve in the proceedings." 6 After the prehearing conference, a prehearing order is
issued which, among other things, states the issues that will be before
the GMHB. 107
It is important that all parties review the statement of issues in
the GMHB's prehearing order. Objections to that statement must be
made within seven days after the date on the prehearing order.'0 8 The
GMHBs' procedural rules require that the statement of issues controls
the proceedings before the GMHBs.'1 9 Both the Western Washington
and Central Puget Sound GMHBs have strictly held parties to the
statement of issues in the prehearing orders."'
6.

The Record on Review

The GMA requires that GMHB decisions be based on the record developed by the local government "and supplemented with additional information if the board determines that such additional
information would be necessary or of substantial assistance to the
GMHB in reaching its decision.""' Although this section appears to
give the GMHB authority to supplement the record, the GMHBs
have been reluctant to exercise that authority in light of the deference
accorded local governments under the GMA."' However, the Western Washington GMHB has allowed parties to supplement the record
with documents bearing on the issue of whether a challenged ordinance should be found invalid."'

105. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-550, 552 (1999).
106.
107.

See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-550(3) (1999).
See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-558(2) (1999).
See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-558 (1999).

108.
109. See id.
110. See Alpine v. Kitsap County, CPSGMHIB No. 98-3-0032c, Final Decision and Order
(Feb. 8, 1999); San Juan County v. Department of Ecology, WWGMHB No. 97-2-0002, Final
Decision and Order (June 19, 1997).
111. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.290(4).
112. See, e.g., Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. Snohomish County, CPSGMHB No. 983-0029, Order on Motions (Oct. 2, 1996); C.U.S.T.E.R. Ass'n v. Whatcom County,
WWGMHB No. 96-2-0008, Final Decision and Order (Sept. 12, 1996); Benton County Fire
Protection Dist. No. 1 v. Benton County, EWGMHB No. 94-1-0023, Final Decision and Order
(Apr. 25, 1995). See also Nielsen, supra note 5, at 1330 (1993) ("[The GMHB] cannot hear
testimony or review documents not heard or read by the City Council before making its
decision.").
113. See Friends of Skagit County v. Skagit County, WWGMHB No. 97-2-0025,
Compliance Hearing Order (Sept. 16, 1998).
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Briefs

Under the GMHBs' procedural rules, issues that are not briefed
are deemed abandoned." 4 The Central Puget Sound GMHB has
strictly applied this rule, refusing to address issues that were either not
11
The
addressed or not adequately addressed in a petitioner's brief.
also
have
GMHBs
Washington
Western
and
Washington
Eastern
16
issues.
unbriefed
address
to
refused
8.

Compliance Proceedings

Under the GMA, a GMHB is authorized in its final order to
either find the local government in compliance with GMA or find the
local government out of compliance with GMA." 7 If the GMHB
finds that the local government is out of compliance with GMA, the
GMHB is required to set a date "not in excess of one hundred eighty
days" by which the local government must come into compliance with
the GMA." 8 After the date for meeting compliance standards has
passed (or before that date if requested by the local government), the
GMHB is required to set a compliance hearing to review the local
government's compliance with the GMA. 119 These compliance hearings are an aspect of GMHB proceedings rife with the opportunity for
procedural confusion.
a. Time for Issuing a Decision on Compliance
The GMA requires that GMHBs give compliance hearings "the
highest priority of business to be conducted by the board, and a finding shall be issued within forty-five days of the filing of the motion"
requesting a compliance hearing. 2 ° Both the Western Washington
and Central Puget Sound GMHBs originally interpreted this provision
as requiring that all compliance orders be issued within forty-five days
of a local government's first submission of a motion or briefing in
support of a finding of compliance.' 2 ' Based on amendments to the
See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-570(1) (1999).
115. See Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0068c, Final Decision
and Order (Mar. 12, 1996). See also Tulalip Tribes of Washington, CPSGMHB No. 96-3-0029,
Final Decision and Order (Jan. 8, 1997) (issues cannot be first addressed in a reply brief).
116. See Wenatchee Valley Mall Partnership v. Douglas County, EWGMHB No. 96-10009, Final Decision and Order (Dec. 10, 1996); Whatcom Environmental Counsel v. Whatcom
County, WWGMHB No. 95-2-0071, Final Decision and Order (Dec. 20, 1995).
117. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300(1).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300(3)(b).
119. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.330(1).
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.330(2).
121. See Hudson v. Clallam County, WWGMHB No. 96-2-0031, Rescission of Invalidity
and Finding of Compliance (Dec. 11, 1997); Whatcom Environmental Council v. Whatcom
114.

GMA ProceduralIssues

1999]

GMA, the Central Puget Sound GMHB now only applies the fortyfive day limitation for issuing compliance decisions where a local government subject to a finding of noncompliance files a motion for a
compliance hearing before expiration of the
time allowed for compli22
ance as established in the GMHB's order)
b.

Scope of ComplianceReview

Another compliance issue that has created a divergence of opinion between the Western Washington and Central Puget Sound
GMHBs is the appropriate scope of the GMHBs' review in compliance proceedings. Originally, both GMHBs agreed that their review
of a local government's compliance with the GMA should focus solely
on whether the local government has "procedurally" complied with
GMA1 23 In other words, the GMHB reviewed only whether the local
government had adopted an enactment addressing the concerns that
led to a finding of noncompliance. The GMHB did not, in the context of a compliance hearing, decide whether a new enactment substantively complied with the GMA. That issue was left for future
GMHB proceedings challenging the local government's new enactment.
The Central Puget Sound GMHB, however, has now modified
this procedure by holding that, under certain circumstances, it will
review a local government's substantive compliance with the GMA
during a compliance hearing. 124 The Central Puget Sound GMHB
listed four criteria it would consider in deciding whether to review
substantive compliance during a compliance hearing:
(1) the
GMHB's schedule; (2) the number of parties; (3) the scope and nature
of the legal issues; and (4) whether new petitions have been filed chal12
lenging the local government's enactment. 1
9.

Settlement

Settlements have not occurred very often in GMHB proceedings.
County, CPSGMHB No. 94-2-0009, Third Compliance Order (Mar. 29, 1996); Friends of the
Law v. King County, CPSGMHB No. 94-3-0009, Order Granting Dispositive Motion (Nov. 8,
1994).
122. See Bremerton v. Kitsap County, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0039, Finding of Noncompliance (May 28, 1996); Vashon-Maury v. King County, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0008, Finding of
Compliance (May 24, 1996).
123. See Wenatchee Mall Partnership v. Douglas County, Order on Petition for Reconsideration EWGMHB No. 97-1-0003 (Mar. 20, 1997); Friends of Skagit County v. Skagit County,
WWGMHB No. 95-2-0065, Finding of Compliance (May 16, 1996); Friends of the Law,
CPSGMHB No. 94-3-0009 (Sept. 16, 1998).
124. See Vashon-Maury, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0008 (May 24, 1996).
125. See id.
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This is the result of the GMA requirement that GMHBs issue final
orders within 180 days of the filing of a petition for review. Such a
short time period for completion of proceedings apparently has not
allowed adequate time to pursue negotiated resolution of GMHB
challenges.
In an effort to encourage settlements, the legislature amended
GMA in 1997 to allow the GMHBs to extend the 180-day time period
for issuing a decision under certain circumstances where a negotiated
resolution might be possible. 126 The GMHB can extend the 180-day
period if all parties request an extension or if "an extension is requested by petitioner and respondent and the board determines that a
the remaining parties could resolve
negotiated settlement between
127
significant issues in dispute.'
As the Western Washington GMHB recognized in Abenroth v.
Skagit County, 28 the provision allowing extensions of time for settlement discussions is not a model of clarity. In Abenroth, the county
and a petitioner raised certain issues in a GMHB challenge and agreed
to an extension of time for resolution of those issues. A different petitioner objected to any postponement of the resolution of the issues in
question, claiming that, in the consolidated proceedings before the
GMHB, petitioner's consent was also required before an extension
could be granted. The Western Washington GMHB disagreed,
holding that in those circumstances where all petitioners did not agree
to an extension of time, an extension could still be granted if requested
by the respondent and the petitioner that actually filed the petition
raising the issues in question. The Board also found that a negotiated
settlement could resolve significant issues in dispute.
10. Motions for Reconsideration
The GMHB rules permit any party to file a motion for reconsideration.' 29 Those rules are less clear as to whether parties have a right
to respond to such a motion, noting that the GMHBs "may require a
party to file an answer to such a motion."' 3 However, both the Western Washington and Central Puget Sound GMHBs have recently held
that parties have a right to respond to motions for reconsideration
regardless of whether the Board requests such a response."'
126. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300(2)(b). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 24202-560 (1999).
127. Id.
128. WWGMHB No. 97-2-0060c, Final Decision and Order (Jan. 23, 1998).
129. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 242-02-832(1) (1999).
130. Id.
131. See Alpine v. Kitsap County, CPSGMHB No. 98-2-0032c, Final Decision and Order
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GMA ProceduralIssues
V.

CONCLUSION

Washington's GMA has established a new system of administrative review of local government's legislative land use planning decisions. The cornerstone of this system is the creation of three GMHBs
with jurisdiction to validate or invalidate local government GMA
planning decisions that are appealed to them. This new land use
appeal system has given the GMHBs a large role in interpreting and
applying the GMA, a role that the GMHBs have arguably expanded
in their own decisions.
The procedural aspects of the GMHB's review-the scope of its
jurisdiction, who has standing to appeal, the burden of proof in appeal
proceedings, and others-all have important implications for the participants in the debate over the implementation of the Act. As the
GMA "comes of age," participants in the GMA debate would therefore be well advised to pay as much attention to procedural details as
to substantive issues.

(Mar. 5, 1999); Friends of Skagit County v. Skagit County, WWGMHB No. 96-2-0025, Order
on Motion (Nov. 23, 1998).

